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From “Reliability” to Uncertainty 
DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN INTERPRETING AND 
APPLYING THE NEW CRAWFORD STANDARD 
Paul L. Shechtman† 
My family once lived across the street from a nut 
wholesaler in lower Manhattan.  Late one night, I saw a man 
crawling out of a broken window in the building, dragging 
behind him bags of nuts.  I immediately reached for the 
telephone, dialed 911, and described what I was seeing.  The 
operator interrupted my report with a few questions to 
establish the building’s location and the details of the man’s 
clothing.  As we spoke, the thief hurried up the street with his 
prize. 
Suffice it to say the burglar was not caught.  What if he 
had been?  Was my 911 call “testimonial” as that term is used 
in Crawford v. Washington?1  Would it matter if the 911 
operator had been trained by the Police Department’s detective 
bureau?  Does it matter that I am familiar with the hearsay 
rule?  What if I had shouted the description to my wife, and not 
the 911 operator? 
As my real-life example suggests (and the hypotheticals 
propounded by Professor Robert Pitler at the Brooklyn Law 
School symposium confirm), Crawford is a law professor’s 
dream and a trial judge’s nightmare.  The familiar framework 
of Ohio v. Roberts2 is gone and in its place is a mode of analysis 
that is exceedingly difficult to apply, at least until the Supreme 
Court provides further guidance.  For now, the best that I can 
offer are a few observations about the changes that Crawford 
has brought and the uncertainty that has followed in its wake. 
  
 † Paul Shechtman is a partner at the law firm of Stillman & Friedman, P.C. 
in New York City and teaches evidence and criminal procedure at Columbia Law 
School.  © 2005 Paul L. Shechtman. 
 1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
306 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
I. BEFORE CRAWFORD:  THE ROBERTS “RELIABILITY” 
STANDARD 
Undoubtedly, there was something intellectually 
unsatisfying about Ohio v. Roberts3, a case which one court 
aptly described as the “‘Sistine Chapel’ of obiter dicta.”4  
Roberts taught that hearsay was constitutionally admissible in 
a criminal trial if it fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”5  The result was a near congruence between 
the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence.  If 
an extrajudicial statement was admissible under the Rules, it 
was almost certainly admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause.  And if it was inadmissible under the Rules, it was 
almost certainly constitutionally inadmissible as well.  It was 
as if the Framers had been prescient enough to write the 
Federal Rules of Evidence into the Sixth Amendment. 
II. CRAWFORD AND THE MEANING OF “TESTIMONIAL” 
For all its intellectual shortcomings, Roberts, I believe, 
asked the right question: was the out-of-court statement 
sufficiently reliable that it could be admitted in a criminal trial 
untested by cross-examination?  Crawford, of course, tells us 
that reliability is not the touchstone – that “[a]dmitting 
statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at 
odds with the right to confrontation . . . [which] 
commands . . . that reliability be assessed . . . by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination.”6  That language might be read 
to mean that all hearsay is constitutionally inadmissible in a 
criminal trial.  Crawford’s holding, however, is not so sweeping.  
Rather, the case holds that the Confrontation Clause excludes 
testimonial statements of witnesses who are absent from trial, 
except (i) where the declarant is unavailable and the defendant 
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him,7 (ii) the 
  
 3 Id. 
 4 People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), aff’d sub nom. 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 5 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 6 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 7 Id. at 59. 
2005] FROM “RELIABILITY” TO UNCERTAINTY 307 
defendant has forfeited his right to confront the witness8 or (iii) 
perhaps if the statement is a testimonial dying declaration.9 
Once reliability is abandoned as the focus of 
Confrontation Clause analysis, we are adrift.  Crawford offers 
three potential definitions of testimonial:  (i) “statements that 
declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially”;10 (ii) “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained 
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’”11; or (iii) 
“‘statements . . . made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness . . . to believe the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.’”12  Although Justice Scalia 
posits that these formulations “share a common nucleus,”13 
they differ greatly.  Consider my excited utterance to the 911 
operator.  Under the second formulation (that advanced by 
Justice Thomas in White v. Illinois),14 the statement is 
constitutionally admissible, since it is not “formalized 
testimonial material.”15  The first and third formulations are 
more difficult to apply.  I suppose that I reasonably expected 
that my utterance would be used “prosecutorially,” if that 
phrase means “used to arrest the perpetrator.”  But would an 
objective observer reasonably believe that the statement would 
be available for use at a later trial?  As I shouted into the 
telephone, I never considered a later trial.  And whether an 
observer hearing my statement would anticipate its use at trial 
would seem to depend on what the observer knew about 
criminal trial practice. 
  
 8 Id. at 62. 
 9 Id. at 56 n.6. 
 10 Id. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-
9410)). 
 11 Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, 
J., concurring)) (alteration in original). 
 12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Brief for the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers et. al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 
(No. 02-9410)). 
 13 Id. 
 14 White, 502 U.S. 346, 362-63, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As a 
matter of plain language . . . it is difficult to see how or why the [Confrontation] Clause 
should apply to hearsay evidence as a general proposition.”). 
 15 Id. at 365. 
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III. THE NEW CRAWFORD  STANDARD:  SHAKY FOUNDATION, 
UNCLEAR CONSEQUENCES 
The questions raised by Crawford are obvious:  Is the 
standard objective or subjective?  If the declarant is a child, 
does one ask whether a reasonable child would expect later 
trial use?  Is the test prosecutorial use or trial use?  For me, it 
is impossible to answer these questions unless one knows the 
reason for asking them.  Is our goal to make criminal trials in 
the 21st century mimic those in 1787?  Is it to prevent Sir 
Walter Raleigh’s case from repeating itself on our shores?  Is it 
to develop a formal definition that best captures those 
instances in which the declarant sees himself (or perhaps 
others see him) as “bearing witness”?  Or is it to ensure that 
defendants are not convicted on the basis of untrustworthy 
hearsay?  As Professor Park said at the symposium, it is 
difficult to develop a coherent confrontation clause 
jurisprudence – i.e., a definition of testimonial – unless “we 
know what we are trying to accomplish.” 
Much of Justice Scalia’s opinion is devoted to 
demonstrating that Roberts was amorphous and unpredictable.  
What he actually shows is that prosecutors and lower courts 
were remarkably adept at finding ways to admit accomplice 
confessions, despite the plurality’s admonition in Lilly v. 
Virginia that it was “highly unlikely” that any such statement 
could survive Confrontation Clause scrutiny.16  If the Crawford 
Court had held that accomplice confessions were per se 
unreliable, much of the unpredictability of Roberts would have 
disappeared, and none of the new unpredictability would exist. 
One of the untoward consequences of Crawford is that it 
seems to have rendered nugatory in criminal cases the 
December 2000 amendment to Rule 803(6).17  That reform was 
designed to allow a business record custodian to submit an 
affidavit in lieu of in-court testimony.18  Most federal 
prosecutors’ offices now believe that such affidavits are 
“testimonial” and have therefore returned to calling custodians 
to testify.  Is it conceivable that such a sensible evidentiary 
  
 16 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion). 
 17 FED. R. EVID. 803(6).  
 18 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendments) (“The 
amendment provides that the foundation requirements of Rule 803(6) can be satisfied 
under certain circumstances without the expense and inconvenience of producing time-
consuming foundation witnesses.  Under current law, courts have generally required 
foundation witnesses to testify.”). 
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reform is unconstitutional?  As Professor Capra pointed out at 
the symposium, Judge Weinstein authored a lucid opinion, 
prior to Crawford, upholding the constitutionality of such a 
business record certification.19  As we say in Brooklyn, if it is 
good enough for Judge Weinstein, it is good enough for me.  Yet 
one can read Crawford to undermine Judge Weinstein’s 
sensible conclusion. 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD  
Where are we headed?  It seems certain that Justice 
Scalia eschewed a more precise definition of “testimonial” so as 
not to fracture his majority.  Pre-Crawford, Justice Thomas 
and Justice Breyer inveighed against Roberts,20 but their 
definitions of “testimonial” may well be different.  The federal 
circuit courts seem to be moving toward a relatively narrow 
definition that limits the term to declarations given in response 
to investigatory questioning.21  A betting person might wager 
that defendants will end up with less constitutional protection 
than if Roberts had been retained and Lilly strengthened.  If so, 
Michael Crawford’s win will be other defendants’ loss. 
  
 19 United States v. Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (foreign 
certification procedure did not violate defendant’s rights). 
 20 See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing White, 502 U.S. at 
363 (Thomas, J., concurring)) (“At the same time, the current hearsay-based 
Confrontation Clause test is arguably too broad . . . .  [I]t is debatable whether the 
Sixth Amendment principally protects ‘trustworthiness,’ rather than ‘confrontation.’”); 
White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is 
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”). 
 21 See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2005), 
mandamus denied sub nom. In re Robinson, 132 Fed. Appx. 418 (3d Cir. 2005); Leavitt 
v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, 683 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2540 (2005); Mungo 
v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 331-32 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. Mungo v. Greene, 
125 S. Ct. 1936 (2005). 
